New York central area toll plan stopped in state assembly
Posted on Wed, 2007-07-11 22:03
The New York City central area toll (CAT) has been blocked by the state assembly. The plan released by Mayor Michael Bloomberg Apr 22 gained the support of the state governor Eliot Spitzer (Dem), most business and local groups, most of the media, and USDOT.
The feds as good as promised $500m for it.
A Senate bill was drafted (SB6068) to implement the scheme.
Although the CAT was advanced as a city initiative, the city council strangely took no position on the plan.
A Quinnipiac opinion survey found that the public opposed the scheme 56% to 37%. It was supported in Manhattan 62% to 29%, but opposed in the four boroughs: 67/26 in Bronx, 63/29 in Brooklyn, 61/32 in Queens and 69/26 in Staten Island. That despite 68% saying they normally use transit to get into Manhattan vs 23% saying they drive.
The CAT was opposed by the assembly speaker Sheldon Silver (Dem Manhattan), by US Rep Pete DeFazio, chairman of the house highways committee, and by the AAA. Speaker Silver appointed an assembly committee chaired by Assemblyman Richard L Brodsky (Dem Westchester) to hold hearings and report.
July 9 it released a report (Brodsky Report) that forcefully rejects the plan. There seems no prospect of advancing the CAT following the Brodsky report.
Press coverage stressed the report's "equity" complaint, the notion that pricing is "regressive." That's there and we mention it at the end here. But the Brodsky report has a lot of other criticisms of the scheme, many of which are well-founded:
1. Major one is that the proposal would produce negligible benefits as described by the Mayor's office - average speeds in the tolled area increasing by only 0.6 miles/hr (1km/hr). In central London with tolls the increase in average speeds was 3km/hr (2mph)about three times as high, and congestion was down a quarter. The toll rates proposed for NYC CAT might have to be doubled to achieve any congestion relief, the Brodsky report says.
2. The proponents of pricing fudged the issue of whether it was a pilot project or intended to be permanent, making them look shifty. The Mayor's initial proposal was cast as a "pilot project" after which a decision would be made as to whether it would be continued. But the bill SB6068 provided that the Mayor would have sole discretion as to whether the scheme would be dropped or continued. This contrasts strongly with the Stockholm CAT which was terminated at a set date and a referendum held, gaining pubic support for its continuation. London's central area charge was never represented as a pilot project but the Mayor there gained some political manadate by making the charge the central issue in his campaign for election.
3. Mayor Bloomberg claimed privacy would be protected by dumping data as soon as it was no longer needed for toll collection but the legislation lacked any privacy requirements in handling of data: "Although 1,000 cameras will photograph the legal activity of citizens, the bill contains no language restricting the manner of operation, data collection, storage, retrieval and disposition."
4. People just moving their cars to the other side of the street to comply with parking requirements were not exempted from the toll.
5. There was no transit improvement plan in place to take displaced motorists.
6. Environmental review is bypassed. The mayor made the claim that asthma and other health problems would be reduced. (Asthma has worsened many places although almost everywhere tailpipe emissions have declined, so it is unlikely further decline in already low tailpipe emissions will reduce asthma.)
7. Toll collection for motorists without transponder is "simply unworkable." (The Brodsky report simply asserts this and doesn't explain why it came to this absurd conclusion. Video tolling of the kind that was proposed by Mayor Bloomberg has worked successfully on many tollroads for many years now - 407ETR in Toronto, Melbourne City Link, on tollroads in Chile and Israel. It is the sole form of toll collection in the central London scheme. It is being used now in Texas and Florida. It is workable and working many places and the Brodsky report doesn't explain why New York City should not be capable of making it work too.)
8. The exclusion of taxis and "liveries" (whatever they are) is unjustified.
9. No protection is given against parking overflow to residents just outside the central area boundary.
The strongest attack on CAT in the Brodsky report is the claim that any pricing is inconsistent with a "traditional New York concern for social and economic fairness."
It declares: "Pricing mechanisms generally and congestion pricing specifically are inconsistent with that tradition, and with the political philosophy usually espoused by the Assembly majority in most areas of government activity." (p8)
The claim is made that pricing mechanisms are "explicitly designed to change individual behavior based on ability to pay."
COMMENT: This is wrong. Pricing mechanisms don't have anything to do with ability to pay. They are simply concerned to clear markets by matching quantities of trips with capacity, regardless of the income and ability to pay of those who make the trips. The plumber trying to squeeze in one more job in his day is likely to have a higher willingness to pay than better off tourists visiting New York and in no rush. Pricing often prices out people with a higher ability, but with a lower willingness, to pay. Pricing is concerned with willingness to pay, not income level.
If pricing of roadspace is so inequitable, as Brodsky suggests, one wonders how he lives with the City's pricing of water, its pricing of bus journeys, the rent it collects on public housing and subway trip fares?
The view that pricing is inherently "regressive" leads by its logic to total rejection of a market economy. If it is wrong for the state to price goods and services then it is equally wrong for businesses to do so. An anti-pricing stance leads logically to the embrace of socialism in which the state allocates resources according to some abstract notion of "need" rather than allowing prices to control markets. But socialism in practice has been a disastrous racket in which a corrupt and self-perpetuating elite controls power and wealth and the masses suffer low standards of living and little opportunity. Most communist countries even - China and Vietnam for example - have abandoned socialism, and rely increasingly on pricing and markets.
BACKGROUND: The CAT proposed was a onetime daily fee of $8 for cars entering the central area (Manhattan south of 86th St) 6am to 6pm, $21 for midsized vehicles and $42 for large. The toll rates are halved for vehicles originating or staying in the central area. Motorists entering via toll bridges and tunnels would be credited the crossing toll against their CAT.
The scheme would rely on an open road all-electronic tolling version of E-ZPass, those without a transponder account being recorded by camera, and having to pay online. About 350 locations would have some 1,000 sets of cameras and transponder readers.
Toll revenues were projected at $620m in the first year rising to $900m by 2030 with $225m initial capital cost and annual operating cost of $240m.
download the Brodsky report here
TOLLROADSnews 2007-07-11
The New York City central area toll (CAT) has been blocked by the state assembly. The plan released by Mayor Michael Bloomberg Apr 22 gained the support of the state governor Eliot Spitzer (Dem), most business and local groups, most of the media, and USDOT. The feds as good as promised $500m for it.
A Senate bill was drafted (SB6068) to implement the scheme.
Although the CAT was advanced as a city initiative, the city council strangely took no position on the plan.
A Quinnipiac opinion survey found that the public opposed the scheme 56% to 37%. It was supported in Manhattan 62% to 29%, but opposed in the four boroughs: 67/26 in Bronx, 63/29 in Brooklyn, 61/32 in Queens and 69/26 in Staten Island. That despite 68% saying they normally use transit to get into Manhattan vs 23% saying they drive.
The CAT was opposed by the assembly speaker Sheldon Silver (Dem Manhattan), by US Rep Pete DeFazio, chairman of the house highways committee, and by the AAA. Speaker Silver appointed an assembly committee chaired by Assemblyman Richard L Brodsky (Dem Westchester) to hold hearings and report.
July 9 it released a report (Brodsky Report) that forcefully rejects the plan. There seems no prospect of advancing the CAT following the Brodsky report.Press coverage stressed the report's "equity" complaint, the notion that pricing is "regressive." That's there and we mention it at the end here. But the Brodsky report has a lot of other criticisms of the scheme, many of which are well-founded:
1. Major one is that the proposal would produce negligible benefits as described by the Mayor's office - average speeds in the tolled area increasing by only 0.6 miles/hr (1km/hr). In central London with tolls the increase in average speeds was 3km/hr (2mph)about three times as high, and congestion was down a quarter. The toll rates proposed for NYC CAT might have to be doubled to achieve any congestion relief, the Brodsky report says.
2. The proponents of pricing fudged the issue of whether it was a pilot project or intended to be permanent, making them look shifty. The Mayor's initial proposal was cast as a "pilot project" after which a decision would be made as to whether it would be continued. But the bill SB6068 provided that the Mayor would have sole discretion as to whether the scheme would be dropped or continued. This contrasts strongly with the Stockholm CAT which was terminated at a set date and a referendum held, gaining pubic support for its continuation. London's central area charge was never represented as a pilot project but the Mayor there gained some political manadate by making the charge the central issue in his campaign for election.
3. Mayor Bloomberg claimed privacy would be protected by dumping data as soon as it was no longer needed for toll collection but the legislation lacked any privacy requirements in handling of data: "Although 1,000 cameras will photograph the legal activity of citizens, the bill contains no language restricting the manner of operation, data collection, storage, retrieval and disposition."4. People just moving their cars to the other side of the street to comply with parking requirements were not exempted from the toll.
5. There was no transit improvement plan in place to take displaced motorists.
6. Environmental review is bypassed. The mayor made the claim that asthma and other health problems would be reduced. (Asthma has worsened many places although almost everywhere tailpipe emissions have declined, so it is unlikely further decline in already low tailpipe emissions will reduce asthma.)
7. Toll collection for motorists without transponder is "simply unworkable." (The Brodsky report simply asserts this and doesn't explain why it came to this absurd conclusion. Video tolling of the kind that was proposed by Mayor Bloomberg has worked successfully on many tollroads for many years now - 407ETR in Toronto, Melbourne City Link, on tollroads in Chile and Israel. It is the sole form of toll collection in the central London scheme. It is being used now in Texas and Florida. It is workable and working many places and the Brodsky report doesn't explain why New York City should not be capable of making it work too.)
8. The exclusion of taxis and "liveries" (whatever they are) is unjustified.
9. No protection is given against parking overflow to residents just outside the central area boundary.
The strongest attack on CAT in the Brodsky report is the claim that any pricing is inconsistent with a "traditional New York concern for social and economic fairness."
It declares: "Pricing mechanisms generally and congestion pricing specifically are inconsistent with that tradition, and with the political philosophy usually espoused by the Assembly majority in most areas of government activity." (p8)
The claim is made that pricing mechanisms are "explicitly designed to change individual behavior based on ability to pay."
COMMENT: This is wrong. Pricing mechanisms don't have anything to do with ability to pay. They are simply concerned to clear markets by matching quantities of trips with capacity, regardless of the income and ability to pay of those who make the trips. The plumber trying to squeeze in one more job in his day is likely to have a higher willingness to pay than better off tourists visiting New York and in no rush. Pricing often prices out people with a higher ability, but with a lower willingness, to pay. Pricing is concerned with willingness to pay, not income level.
If pricing of roadspace is so inequitable, as Brodsky suggests, one wonders how he lives with the City's pricing of water, its pricing of bus journeys, the rent it collects on public housing and subway trip fares?
The view that pricing is inherently "regressive" leads by its logic to total rejection of a market economy. If it is wrong for the state to price goods and services then it is equally wrong for businesses to do so. An anti-pricing stance leads logically to the embrace of socialism in which the state allocates resources according to some abstract notion of "need" rather than allowing prices to control markets. But socialism in practice has been a disastrous racket in which a corrupt and self-perpetuating elite controls power and wealth and the masses suffer low standards of living and little opportunity. Most communist countries even - China and Vietnam for example - have abandoned socialism, and rely increasingly on pricing and markets.
BACKGROUND: The CAT proposed was a onetime daily fee of $8 for cars entering the central area (Manhattan south of 86th St) 6am to 6pm, $21 for midsized vehicles and $42 for large. The toll rates are halved for vehicles originating or staying in the central area. Motorists entering via toll bridges and tunnels would be credited the crossing toll against their CAT.
The scheme would rely on an open road all-electronic tolling version of E-ZPass, those without a transponder account being recorded by camera, and having to pay online. About 350 locations would have some 1,000 sets of cameras and transponder readers.
Toll revenues were projected at $620m in the first year rising to $900m by 2030 with $225m initial capital cost and annual operating cost of $240m.
download the Brodsky report here
TOLLROADSnews 2007-07-11
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| AssemblyReportAgstCAT.pdf | 232.92 KB |